Talking to the enemy before you have wasted him…and when he thinks he can still waste you…what bastards the EU and the UN are to our men, who fight and die for them…

David Davis 

Trust the UN and the EU to shoot Britain and the liberal world in the foot. In the middle of a war, to boot (no pun intended.)

 Here is it in black and white.  It had of course to be those arch-Quislings of the West the EU (which is a Soviet) and the permanently-embedded foe of it which we even pay for, the UN (Useless Nothings) involved, didn’t it. No surprises at all there, then. I ownder when they’ll learn where their bread is buttered – or are the actually the enemy demolition-parties that I have suspected them of being all along?

Rot in hell, bastards. Merry Christmas, and thank you very, very much. Friends of friends of yours might have been dying on patrol, but on second thoughts I don’t think any of them or theirs would want to know or live near people like you. I don’t think our soldiers would want to be photgraphed standing next to you (I quote one of our Generals in Bosnia, regarding I think it was Tony Blair! Or it might have been John Major, but they’re the same droid anyway, the outer casing just got changed when the droid got re-elected in 1997.)

You DO NOT TALK TO your enemy, until he is defeated, and rolling, crying in the blood and dust, in front of you. And, if he’s an enemy of liberalism, NOT EVEN THEN; the stakes are too high and we have to get off this planet in time, and not be delayed. We don’t behave like this but the enemies of liberty do, for they are more primitive and pre-enlightenment than we are, and closer perhaps to the reality of primordial conflict and its psychology – locked in an age before the realistaion of how fragile our total exictence may be. they can afford to kill locally, for nowhere that exists at all, ever, is more than a few miles away.

We must get back the will to inflict terrible, ghastly, memorable defeat on those who are both (1) wrong and (2) simultaneously try to force us to believe they are right.

Otherwise, the concept of “terrible defeat” and what its purpose is, loses all meaning: there is no point then in fighting wars against wrong-people for they will not be make to learn right. Then, the world descends to the level of a modern British secondary-school classroom, in which nothing is learned at all (see the Wireless tele-Vision News any day), and the West (which is right) will continue to be embattled by Evil until it’s too late to go away.

Interesting, that SIS officers were allegedly “talking” to the buggers too. Perhaps Christmas is a good time to bury bad news

Great post for Boxing Day I had to do and it’s your fault you two traitors in the article, thank you.

2 responses to “Talking to the enemy before you have wasted him…and when he thinks he can still waste you…what bastards the EU and the UN are to our men, who fight and die for them…

  1. Dave:

    The history of MI6 is the unacknowledged history of British foreign policy. It’s hardly fair to blame the two MI6 officers, who were doing what they were told to do.

    Having gotten rid of the Taliban State (a pretty sketchy affair), we find ourselves with the usual problems of “nation-building.” Afghan society is notoriously tribal, and putting together any kind of government which could withstand Taliban counterattacks assisted from outside. In addition, we have the conflict between the “War on Drugs” and the fact that a vast proportion of Afghanis are economically dependent on poppy-growing.

    We don’t want to stay in Afghanistan forever; and a “Phoenix-style” assassination program would be very difficult to carry through without accusations of genocide, even if we had the accurate intelligence to attempt it.

    So, Dave, what are we to do?

    Regards, and a Happy New Year,


  2. Dave:

    Try starting here.

    And remember that Kissinger and Nixon sold out South Vietnam in Paris 1973, at a time when General Giap, in his [1988] memoirs, said that he was amazed, because the NVA thought the Americans were _winning_…



    “The circumstances rendered the NVA vulnerable to the B-52s at a
    moment in the war when experience and technology had perfected
    the employment of the bombers. The Strategic Air Command had
    learned during the siege of Khe Sanh that three B-52s provided
    enough destructive effect to satisfy most ground commanders. SAC
    now launched the planes in flights of three rather than the
    original six in order to duoble the number of Arc Lights. A new
    radar system named Combat Skyspot made it possible to place the
    strikes within five-eighths of a mile of friendly positions.
    (Rhotenberry and Ba did not hesitate to call a strike within 700
    yards.) The location of the ‘box’, the target zone that was
    five-eighths of a mile wide by approximately two miles long,
    could be changed up to three hours before the bombs were
    scheduled to fall. Rhotenberry kept a list of every B-52 strike
    allocated to the battle with the drop time and change time
    marked in order to switch the box to a new location and catch
    the NVA in it when an assault was imminent or underway against a
    sector of the perimeter…

    Ba was able to give the tank-killer teams he formed some
    psychological preparation by having them practice firing the
    M-72 LAW at junked ARVN tank hulls. The Pentagon had time to
    respond to an appeal from Abrams and rush out an experimental
    helicopter-mounted system for the American wire-guided anti-tank
    missile, called the TOW for tube-launched, optically-tracked,
    wire-guided. Two Hueys in which the system had been installed
    were loaded into C-141 jet transports at the Yuma Proving
    Grounds in Arizona and flown directly to Pleiku. Jeep-mounted
    version of the TOW also arrived, but they were not to prove
    useful. The NVA commanders could use their tanks to lead an
    assault that began at night. The dimensions of the battle
    forced them to continue the assault into the day with the tanks
    maintaining a spearpoint role. Hill would have the Hueys with
    the TOWs over Kontum at first light, and any T-54 in sight was
    _doomed_. One tank crew backed its behemoth into a house to hide.
    The TOW team got the tank by shooting throgh a window.

    Vann made the bombers his personal weapon. He could have left
    the B-52 targeting to Hill and Rhotenberry and the efficient
    officers in his G-3, air operations section, but he wanted to do
    it himself. Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Toan, who Cao Van Vien
    finally recruited to replace Dzu, and the Vietnamese staff at
    the Pleiku headquarters nicknamed Vann “Mr. B-52.” (Toan had
    been sidelined for excessive graft and a scandal over a girl.
    Vien had proposed to him that he redeem his career and gain
    another star by volunteering to take II Corps, and being a
    courageous man, Toan had accepted. Vien admonished him to
    listen to Vann.)

    The Strategic Air Command was sending Creighton Abrams
    three-plane flights of B-52s at roughly hourly intervals around
    the clock from Anderson Air Force Base on Guam, and the B-52
    base at Sattahip in southern Thailand. By mid-May, when the
    struggle for Kontum began, the siege of An Loc on the cambodian
    front had crested, and it was apparrent that the ARVN garrison
    there would survive. In I Corps, after overrunning all of Quang
    Tri province and pressing towards Hue from the west too, the NVA
    thrusts had also started to falter under the weight of U.S. air
    power. Hue looked like it was going to stand. Kontum was the
    last opportunity the Vietnames Communists had to transform an
    offensive with important but limited objectives into a
    spectacular achievement, and it was Abrams’ last big worry. He
    could let Vann have the bombers. Capt. Christopher Scudder, the
    B-52 control officer on Vann’s staff, recalled that on some days
    at the height of the battle, Vann lobbied hard enough to obtain
    twenty-one of the twenty-five B-52 flights coming into the
    country every day.

    Between May 14 and the end of the first week of June, John
    Paul Vann laid the best part of three hundred B-52 strikes in the
    environs of Kontum. To increase the safety margin in strikes
    close to friendly positions, SAC had instructed the bombers to
    fly one behind the other down the center of the box. This
    formation didn’t give sufficient bomb coverage to satisfy Vann.
    He persuaded SAC to place the three B-52s in Echelon. The first
    bomber flew right along the safety line to get as close as
    possible to the ARVN positions and plaster the inner third of the
    box, the second B-52 flew just behind and beyond it to devastate
    the middle, and the third came right behind and beyond it to
    obliterate anything left in the target zone. Vann would circle
    in his Ranger off a scheduled strike a few minutes before the
    B-52s arrived and then low-level round the box as soon as the
    smoke and dust had cleared enough for him to see how many NVA he
    had killed. He would fire bursts from his M-16 into the bomb
    craters. There was no danger, he explained to two reporters
    riding with him one day. Anyone “still living in there is in
    such a state of shock that he couldn’t pull a trigger for thirty
    minutes.” On another day he found forty to fifty NVA who had
    survived, staggering around among the craters. He radioed for
    Cobra gunships to finish them off.

    Larry Stern of the _Washington Post_ had met Vann in the
    mid-1960s throgh Frank Scotton. He came to Pleiku to interview
    him, and was astonished by the man he found. He had never seen a
    person so suffused with rage and exhaltation. Stern remembered
    the way Vann’s eyes ‘burned’ as he described how he was wielding
    the B-52 bombers. “Anytime the wind is blowing from the north
    where the B-52s are turning the terrain into a moonscape, you can
    tell from the battlefield stench that the strikes are effective,”
    Vann said. “Outside Kontum, wherever you dropped bombs you
    scattered bodies…”

    From Neil Sheehan, “A Bright Shining Lie”, [1988]. An unmissable history.

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