War and liberalism


David Davis

Statists and other varieties of socialist have more or less succeeded in making the planet as dangerous a place as the buggers can get away with. Liberal minimal-statism will never, ever be forgiven for causing useless pre-capitalist-barbarian intellectuals and poseurs to be fully redundant.

This article in the Torygraph caught my eye this morning, and filled me with forebodings concerning certain things that happened in Britain’s recent history. I regard event like WW2 as having happened “this morning”, sometimes, in the light of how I perceive the March Of Time.

It is in general not good to (as the late Osama-bin-Liner said about weak and strong horses) seem to be a weak horse. This is because that Man’s biological instincts and use of neo-English-social-rationality are not at all walking in step in the majority of populations, nations and races today, in contrast generally with how they are in populations inside the Anglosphere.

Modern “Democrat” US Presidents seem to be an exception, a sort of throwback to pre-settlement-primitivism, in which you go out occasionally to slaughter and eat the other tribe’s males and capture their animals and women and girls for breeding and perhaps eating later (that’s the women, perhaps aged as much as 17 or 18, and whose teeth have started to fall out or smell or who can’t seem to calf a live-male-baby more than once a year.)

Here’s what I said earlier on facebook about Sir Peter Wall’s rather good advice to the government. As is clear, on that platform I always try to adopt a much more viciously-populist, shrill and more strident tone of voice (I require some rather timely and soon election-wins by UKIP, anywhere where the British-LabourNazi party’s Writ-of-Praemunire over “postal voting forms” can be challenged):-

Our problem is that we have (sometimes) very very good kit. Then the ChIndo-Americans steal the plans and make it smaller, cheaper and faster.

 For example: we invented…The Rail-Way (both a war weapon and a general-goods-cost-reducer) hence state-imposed “standard-gauge”)…tracked tanks…breech-loading artillery…iron warships (some even steam-powered)…radar…the atom bomb (yes we did, we were ahead of the lot in 1942 and moving faster, but were also bust)…aircraft-carriers…revolving mines that bounced on water…Hobart’s Funnies (specialised engineering vehicles)…the jet-engine (such a banal thing that I almost forgot)…

 Then, as true all through our modern history we go into a war, sometimes the wrong one but sometimes the right one, but all-unprepared because we’re not the kind of civilisation that glorifies warlike behaviour. We then go bankrupt in the pursuit – always justified – of Mankind’s mortal enemy at that moment. Regarding WW1, I tend to side with King George V who said on record that, er, yes it was an unimaginable disaster for us, but that he couldn’t see what else we could have done.

 WW2 was the inevitable result of the very very unsatisfactory and very  bad USA/French-directed “peace of Versailles”, and again we had no moral alternative, even while being less able to land troops in Poland than we’d have been able to do on Mars.

 The planet would by now be an even shittier place than it it is if we’d not opposed Napoleon with utter resolution, and finally brought the bastard down. (For f***’s sake, he arranged Council Refuse Collections while in exile on Elba – why could nobody else see what was coming to torment us then?)

 Then to cap it all, we disown and dump and despise our returning soldiers, from the Armada onwards. we don’t really “know, as a civilisation, how to _do war_ : that’s our problem.

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4 responses to “War and liberalism

  1. Actually both the French commander (Foch) and the American commander (“Black Jack” Pershing) protested against letting Germany off at the end of the First World War – they wanted to march into Berlin and break up Germany (restore an independent Bavaria and so on).

    However, Woodrow Wilson basically got his way (Germany was let off) with the British Prime Minister basically supporting the Wilson position – although thinking he went a bit too far.

    The idea Germany was treated too harshly at the end of the First World War is a myth invented partly by German propaganda and party by J.M. Keynes (who continued to play the German line even in the introduction to the German edition of his “General Theory…….” in 1936, having done so since “The Economic Consequences of Peace”).

    As Foch said (in despair) at the 1919 peace conference – this is not a peace (for Germany had not been broken up) “this is a 20 year truce”.

    If only the Empress Elizabeth of Russia had lived a few months longer in the 18th century – then the Prussia of Frederick the Great would have been smashed, and “scientific” statism nipped in the bud.

  2. Could the First World War have been prevented in 1914?

    Possibly – but only if large scale British forces had been sent to reinforce France and Belgium at once (as soon as the crises started). The German government was left in DOUBT – thinking that the British might not intervene (or if the British did intervene it would be “too little, too late” if Germany hit hard and fast). A clear PHYSICAL showing of British resolve might (just might) have caused second thoughts in the German High Command.

    Sir Edward Grey wasted vital time desperately appealing for a conference on the Balkans (and hinting that he would take the Austrian side in such a conference – against Serbia), not understanding that to the German elite Serbia (indeed even the Hapsburg Empire) were not the issue. The point was to use the EXCUSE of the conflict between the Hapsburg Empire and the Serbs, in order to destroy both France and Russia (both of whom. contrary to Max Hastings, were on track to become more economically competitive with Germany in the future – France was stronger in the “new industries”, and Russia had much faster economic growth, although from a much lower base, than Germany did).

    The German dream (shared by the Kaiser himself) of using the united resources of Europe (united under Germany) to destroy Britain and its Empire and then dominate-the-world (hence the obsessive interest among the German elite with the subversion of South, and North, America) could not be achieved without the prior destruction of Russia and France – and that chance was slipping away in 1914 (the longer Germany waited the harder the task would become).

    The Second World War.

    The Second World War could indeed have been prevented.

    Had the British (and the French) remained firm in their support for Czechoslovakia in early 1938 then Hitler would not have invaded (the defence network in the border region was actually very strong), or (if Hitler, in an insane fit, had ordered an invasion) the German army would have removed him. The German army in early 1938 was not fit for general war – even as it was (after the border region was just handed to the Nazis on a plate) the German tanks broke down in the road to Prague – the Nazi war machine needed the Czech arms factories that N. Chamberlain handed them.

    In his obsession with peace it was Neville Chamberlain who (by his weakness) made war inevitable.

    Neville’s half brother Austin Chamberlain, knew the truth about the Nazis (he went on a visit to Germany – and, by accident, got off the official route and witnessed things he was not supposed to see) and tried to warn the British government. But Austin Chamberlain was dead before the Munich conference.

  3. As for liberalism.

    Liberalism is based (as the French President in 1914 pointed out) on there being “Universal Principles” of “Reason, Justice and Liberty”.

    The German academic-political elite (very close in Germany – the most “educated” of nations) in 1914 did not even believe that such “Universal Principles” existed.

    Tragically the sickness of historicism and moral relativism was also present among the academic and political elite of France, Britain and the United States – although the decay had not proceeded so far as it had in Germany in 1914.

  4. Whatever the value of hindsight, Neville Chamberlain was trying to avoid a repeat of the pointless carnage of the Great War, just 20 years previously, a war itself which Britain should never have got involved in; on the Western Front, the French were a markedly inferior army to the Germans and would have rapidly lost. Millions of lives would not have been lost, Russia would not have become the USSR, and England would have been unharmed by what would have been just another Continental spat. It’s understandable why a British PM would have wanted to avoid another similar calamity.